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Article Title: An Equilibrium Model of Signaling, Production, and Exchange 
 
Abstract 
This article provides an equilibrium model of signaling, production, and exchange. It goes beyond 
previous models by examining signaling in a setting in which sellers allocate resources between 
signaling and producing a good with a high versus low intrinsic quality. In contrast to partial 
equilibrium models where one side is often kept to its reservation value, both sides of the exchange 
are made worse off due to the distortive signaling activities. Buyers read signals, screen for quality 
of each good, choose prices optimally, and pay money in exchange. The Cobb-Douglas utilities 
depend on the amount of money received or kept, the intrinsic quality of each good, and the quantity 
consumed. The advantage of the model is to illustrate how sellers make tradeoffs between 
production and signaling, which can be verified empirically, and how buyers choose how much to 
purchase of high quality versus low quality goods. The total numbers of sellers of the two types 
determine the total production of goods in the market, and the total number of buyers determines the 
total presence of money in the market. A signaling attention function adjusts how buyers pay 
attention to signals. The competitiveness of the market plays a role. Signaling causes scarcity of 
goods which causes price inflation which is adjusted for. Search costs for choosiness are introduced 
for buyers screening for quality, which reduces the amount of money held by buyers, causing less to 
be paid to sellers.   3
1 Introduction 
Production, consumption, and exchange have been central to economic theory for centuries. After 
some groundwork since the 1960s,
1 Spence (1973) asked the path breaking question of whether 
high quality producers can signal superior quality through costly effort. If so, do consumers use 
such signals to screen for quality? Spence seeked to explain how individuals with similar talents can 
have different returns to accumulation of human capital in form of education. His approach led to a 
continuum of informationally consistent equilibria. Riley (1975) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) 
introduced competition in the screening dimension, timed the sequence of actions, and specified the 
information sets of the agents. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) reframed Spence’s approach as a 
noncooperative game between the uninformed insurance companies and the consumers. See 
Lofgren et al. (2002) and Riley (2001) for historical reviews of signaling and screening, Riley 
(2002) for model testing, and e.g. Noldeke and Samuelson (1997) for a dynamic approach. 
One main characteristic of today’s signaling literature is that these are partial equilibrium 
models which in their simplest form may look as follows. The seller wants to sell one unit of a good 
and knows whether it has high or low quality. The buyer wants to buy the good but cannot observe 
the quality with certainty. The seller moves first by setting a take-it-or-leave it price which is the 
signal. The buyer decides whether or not to buy the good. The seller’s expected profit is his price 
minus his valuation, multiplied with the probability that the buyer buys, plus his valuation 
multiplied with the probability that the buyer does not buy. The buyer’s profit is his valuation of the 
good he happens to receive (high or low quality) minus his price, multiplied with the probability 
that he buys, plus his price multiplied with the probability that he does not buy. The seller may bluff 
by signaling an unreasonably high price. The buyer knows he may be bluffed, he may fear a lemon 
(Akerlof 1970), and will in equilibrium pay less than the high quality good is worth. Such 
asymmetric information thus causes market failure. The large literature on partial equilibrium 
models contains many variations. The good may have a continuum of qualities. Potential gains of 
trade may be possible, or guaranteed in the sense that the seller’s valuation is lower than buyer’s 
willingness to pay, for both the high quality and low quality good. The buyer may observe a noisy 
observation of the quality, and the seller may not know the buyer’s perception of quality. 
                                                 
1 Vickrey (1961) analyzed incentives for agents with private information, Mirrlees (1971) combined incentives with 
redistribution, and Akerlof (1970) showed how exchange can collapse with uncertainty about product quality.   4
This article develops a signaling model that intends to address the deficiencies of partial 
equilibrium models. First, we design a setting in which sellers allocate resources between signaling 
and producing a good which has high intrinsic quality for high quality producers, and low intrinsic 
quality for low quality producers. This demonstrates the tradeoff, which can be verified empirically, 
the seller makes between designing a production department for production, versus a 
sales/marketing department for signaling. Second, buyers read signals, screen for quality of each 
good, choose prices optimally, and pay money (or some numeraire good) in exchange. Third, all 
agents have Cobb-Douglas utilities. Each seller’s two free choice variables are how much to 
consume of his own good and how much to signal. Each buyer’s free choice variables are what 
prices to choose. Fourth, the total numbers of sellers of the two types determine the total production 
of goods in the market, and the total number of buyers determines the total presence of money in the 
market. Fifth, the competitiveness of the market plays a role through a signaling decisiveness 
parameter. Sixth, a power of truth parameter allows the buyer to be partly informed about the 
intrinsic qualities, scaled continuously from uninformed to fully informed. Seventh, price inflation 
is accounted for. Eighth, search costs for choosiness are introduced for the buyer, acknowledging 
that the process of distinguishing high quality from low quality goods is costly. 
These characteristics are such that we refer to the model as a general equilibrium model of 
signaling.
2 General equilibrium models were common before the time before Spence (1973), and 
are of course also pervasive in economic theory today. The author believes that the dominant 
presence of partial equilibrium models within economic signaling theory should be supplemented 
with a general equilibrium model of signaling accounting for the eight characteristics outlined 
above. 
Signaling has received some attention within biology where the focus is different. There has 
been little or no cross-fertilization. Partial equilibrium models is to the author’s knowledge 
uncommon or not present within biology, whereas a general equilibrium approach is more common, 
and there is often a link to genetics. Examples are Bergstrom and Lachmann (1997), Bergstrom et 
al. (2002), Eshel et al. (2002), Getty (1998ab, 2002, 2005), Gintis et al. (2001), Grafen (1990ab), 
Hausken and Hirshleifer (2004), Houston (2003), Proulx et al. (2002), Zahavi (1975). Males come 
in two or more than two qualities, and females mate dependent on male signaling. Such models 
                                                 
2 A search with the key words general equilibrium and signaling in the economics literature gives almost no hits.   5
have neither production, prices, nor consumption of goods, but males are analogous to producers 
or sellers who prefer their signals about quality to be believed. Similarly, females are buyers who 
screen for quality. The agents maximize utility interpreted as reproductive success. 
Grafen (1990:537-538) briefly discusses the relation between biological and economic 
signaling. He argues that if economic signaling is to be interpreted biologically, it would be “as if 
the female had to pay a male an amount related to her assessment of his quality….. If females do 
pay a cost of a male’s advertising, it is not a cost that benefits the male.” He concludes that “despite 
the formal similarities, the biological models and Riley’s (1979) model provide little mutual 
enlightenment.” This may be one explanation of why biological and economic signaling have 
developed differently. This article illustrates a larger compatibility between biological and economic 
signaling. The buyer (female) pays a cost in the following sense because of the sellers’ (males’) 
signaling. Because of signaling each seller produces less (has lower net quality), and hence 
consumes less and delivers less to the buyer. Hence the buyer suffers a reduction in the amount of 
good x that she receives from the seller (gets a male that has wasted some of his resources on 
signaling). 
This article starts out with a basic model of exchange without signaling in section 2. A good 
is produced in two qualities by high quality and low quality producers referred to as sellers. Buyers 
hold money with a fixed and known quality. Whether the good is of high or low quality is unknown 
to the buyers, so sellers have an incentive to signal quality. Introducing signaling in section 3, each 
seller makes a tradeoff between how much of his resource to invest into production versus 
signaling. Signaling is detrimental since it takes away resources from production. The utility from 
consuming a good arises only from the intrinsic quality of the good, and the quantity consumed. 
Sellers signal to boost sales. A signaling attention function adjusts how buyers pay attention to 
signals. Signaling causes decreased production and availability of the good which causes the price 
of good x to increase. To account for such price inflation, section 4 divides each buyer’s monetary 
payment with an inflation factor, which means that the prices are divided by the same inflation 
factor. Section 5 incorporates screening search costs for the buyers, acknowledging that the process 
of distinguishing high quality from low quality goods is costly. Section 6 combines search costs and 
inflation adjustment. Section 7 concludes. 
   6
2 A model without signaling
3 
Consider two goods. The first is the numeraire good y which is money with known quality. The 
second is good x subject to quality differentials and unknown quality. There are n identical agents 
holding good y which we refer to as buyers. The buyers can be considered as holding various jobs 
which generate (produce) money as good y. We could more generally consider the numeraire good 
y as any good such as corn, which is produced by the buyers in the same manner as good x is 
produced by the sellers. The model thus applies equally well for goods in non-monetary exchange 
societies. We interpret good y as money which is straightforwardly associated with our present-day 
monetary societies. Buyers are more easily thought of as holding money when purchasing goods, 
and sellers are more easily thought of as being paid in money rather than some other numeraire 
good. 
There are n1 identical producers of the high quality good x1 which we refer to as the high 
quality sellers. There are finally n2 identical producers of the low quality good x2 which we refer to 
as the low quality sellers. The quality differentials are quantitative. A unit of x1 differs from a unit of 
x2 only in the amount of the intrinsic quality contained therein. One unit of xi has intrinsic quality zi, 
i=1,2,  12 zz ≥ . One example is different mineral ores, whose quality depends only upon the % of the 
gold or iron contained. A second example is tomatoes which differ according to nutrient quality and 
other ingredients. A third example is cars which differ in speed, petrol consumption, durability, 
comfort, safety characteristics, etc.. 
We assume scalability along one dimension for tractability reasons. Future research may 
consider several dimensions of signalling, which is more complicated. Scalability along one 
dimension does not mean that one car is better than another car in equal proportions for all 
characteristics. It is quite possible that the high quality car is 70% better than the low quality car in 
safety, 30% worse in acceleration and maximum speed, and 40% better in comfort. Averaging out 
the three dimensions, the high quality car may then be, say, 50% better than the low quality car in an 
overall sense, dependent on the relative weighting of safety, comfort, and acceleration/speed. E.g., 
we may have z1=3 and z2=2. The intrinsic qualities z1 and z2 may thus be conceived as indices 
composed of arbitrarily many components. Cars that are sufficiently different from each other, such 
                                                 
3 This section 2 can be written directly with signaling, replacing equations (1) and (12) with the corresponding signaling 
equations in section 3. However, for a general interest journal, the author currently believes that it is pedagogic to write 
this section without signaling to illustrate the difference between no signaling and signaling.   7
as family cars and sports cars, do not compete with each other through signaling and are 
considered as different goods, with different production and signaling processes targeting different 
consumers.
4 
The production constraints for sellers and buyers are 
,, 1 , 2 ii i R a x R ay i == =   Production constraint (1) 
where R and Ri are the resources (capital, labor, etc.) for buyers and sellers, respectively, and a and 
ai are unit production costs. Buyers with high paying jobs have low a which generates much money 
y. Similarly, sellers with efficient production facilities have low ai which generates much of good x. 
We hereafter suppress the specification i=1,2 in the equations. 
Seller i consumes a part xic of his production xi, and sells the remaining part xi-xic to the 
buyer for the price Pi. In exchange the seller gets yic which is the monetary payment he gets from the 
buyer in terms of good y. That part of the high quality seller’s production that the buyer purchases is 
valued by the buyer with the per unit price P1, and that part of the low quality seller’s production 
that the buyer purchases is valued by the buyer with the per unit price P2. That is, Pi is an interior 
terms-of-exchange price denoting the price of xi-xic in terms of the numeraire good y which, as 
money, has a price one per unit. The price Pi is a free choice variable for the buyer consistently with 
the subjective theory of value.
5 Some economic theory considers sellers as price setters, but buyers 
choose whether or not to purchase at that price. If the price is unacceptable, there will be no buyers. 
In a deeper philosophical sense, this is consistent with letting the buyer be the ultimate price 
chooser. The subjective price Pi may thus differ from the intrinsic quality zi. Seller i’s sale is 
accordingly valued at  ( ) ii i c Px x − . The value of yic to the seller is 1 ic y ⋅  where money y is valued at 
one. This gives seller i’s market constraint 
1( ) ic i i ic yP x x ⋅= −   Seller i’s market constraint (2) 
                                                 
4 That is, family cars and sports cars are so different that they can coexist within the same niche without one driving out 
the other. Some empirics from population biology suggests the principle known as competitive exclusion. If the weight 
ratio of the animals exceeds 2 to 1, or the length difference exceeds 1.4 to 1, then the different species can coexist. If 
coexistence is possible, different signaling regimes apply for the two species (family cars versus sports cars). If 
coexistence is not possible, signaling is one factor that may drive the least fit species out of the niche. E.g., a hybrid 
family car/sports cars may be driven out of the market if it looks too much either like a family car or a sports cars. 
5 Subjective value theory is a main pillar of the Austrian school, and dates back to the medieval Scholastic philosophers. 
They assert that to possess value an object must be both useful and scarce (Hayek 1968). This can also be phrased such 
that the buyer determines the value of the object (Hobbes 1651).   8
Equation (2) simultaneously defines the price  i P =/ ( ) ic i ic yxx −  as the amount of money y 
consumed by seller i divided by the amount of good x that seller i delivers to the buyer in exchange. 
As the buyer gets more, so that xi-xic increases, the per unit price Pi decreases, which makes good xi 
cheaper. Conversely, if xi-xic decreases, good xi becomes more scarce for buyers, and the price Pi 
increases. Also, as seller i gets more money y for a given amount xi-xic of good xi, so that yic 
increases, the price Pi increases, since the buyer then pays more money y, and conversely if yic 
decreases.  
Analogously, the buyer’s production is valued at 1 y ⋅ . The buyer consumes a part yc of her 
monetary possession y, which can mean enjoying money for its own sake, or burning money, but 
which more realistically means using the monetary possession to purchase other goods than good x. 
The buyer delivers as monetary payment the remaining part y-yc to the two types of sellers. In 
exchange the buyer gets xc, which is a combination of x1 and x2, valued with the average intrinsic 
quality z.
6 We define z as the average of z1 and z2, weighted with the productions  11 nx and  22 nx, i.e. 
111 222 11 22 () / ( ) zz n xz n xn x n x =+ +   Average intrinsic quality (3) 
This gives the buyer’s market constraint 
1( ) cc zx y y =⋅ −   Buyer’s market constraint (4) 
The buyer’s consumption xc is valued at the intrinsic quality z, which is what the buyer actually gets 
to consume, and not valued as a combination of P1 and P2. The prices P1 and P2 only play a role in 
the buyer’s evaluation of x1 and x2. For the market to clear, the total consumption of money y must 
equal the total possession (which can be conceived as production if money is interpreted as a 
numeraire good) of money y. The n1 high quality sellers consume y1c each, the n2 low quality sellers 
consume y2c each, and the n buyers consume yc each. The total possession by the n buyers is ny. 
This gives 
11 22 cc c n y n y ny ny ++ =   Market clearance of y (5) 
Solving (5) with respect to y, inserting into (4), and solving with respect to  c zx  gives 
11 22 () / cc c zx n y n y n =+  (6) 
                                                 
6 Although not used in the formal development, we can think of the symbol y as representing the quality-adjusted 
equivalent of x, so that y = zx.   9
Summing the LHS’s of (2) and (4) for the n1, n2, n agents, and setting equal to the sum of the 
RHS’s gives the redundant equation 
11 22 11 1 1 22 2 2 ()( ) ( ) cc c c c c ny ny n z x P n x x Pn x x ny y ++ = − + − + −  (7) 
Subtracting (5) from (7) gives the redundant equation 
111 222 111 222 cc c n z x Pnx Pnx Pnx Pnx ++ = +  Redundant market clearance of x (8) 
which redundantly expresses that total consumption of x equals total production of x. Hence solving 
(8) with respect to  c zx  gives (6) when (2) is inserted. 
The value of seller i’s consumption of his own production is  ii c zx , where the intrinsic 
quality zi, and not Pi, plays a role. The seller needs no buyer to tell him how to value that part of his 
own production which he himself consumes. He simply enjoys the intrinsic quality zi of his 
production, just as the buyer enjoys the intrinsic quality 1 of her production. 
We assume Cobb-Douglas utilities 
11 () , ( ) , 0 1 i i ic ic c c Uz x y U z x y
ββ ββ β
−− == ≤ ≤  Cobb-Douglas  utilities  (9) 
where U is the buyer’s utility, Ui is seller i’s utility, and β is a parameter which expresses the 
relative preference for good x. 
Each seller’s strategic choice variable is how much, expressed as xic, of his own production 
xi valued at zi to consume. The remaining part, xi-xic, he sells to the buyer in exchange for money 
yic. Each seller takes the price Pi as given when choosing the optimal xic. Inserting (2) into (9), 
derivating Ui with respect to xic, setting the derivative equal to zero, solving with respect to xic, and 












  Seller i’s FOC (xic) (10) 
That’s a very straightforward choice for seller i. He simply consumes a fraction β of his production, 
which is the relative weight he assigns to good xi, that is, relative to money y, in his Cobb-Douglas 
utility. Expressed differently, equation (10) expresses that the representative seller i balances the 
marginal benefit against the marginal cost of consuming one additional unit xic of his production xi. 
The LHS of the equation is the marginal benefit of consuming xic, and it equals the RHS which is 
the marginal cost of xi multiplied with β which expresses how valuable is good xi relative to money   10
y. Equation (10) states that you consume more of your production if you value good xi more 
relative to money y. Inserting (10) into (2), (4), (6) gives 
111 222 () ( 1 )
(1 ), , ic i i c c c
Pnx Pn x





=− = = −  (11) 
The representative buyer’s strategic choice variable is which price Pi she is willing to pay for each 
unit of the good xi=Ri/ai. Her choice is implicitly a choice of how much money y, that is y-yc, to 
deliver to the sellers. The buyer sets the price ratio P1/P2 equal to the ratio z1/z2 of intrinsic qualities, 
i.e. 
12 12 // PP zz =  Price  ratio  (12) 
When choosing the optimal price Pi, the buyer uses (11) to determine the impact Pi has on her 
consumption of xc valued at the intrinsic quality z, and her consumption of yc valued at one. 
Inserting (11) into (9), derivating U with respect to Pi, and setting the derivative equal to zero, gives 
111 222 () ( 1 )
0 c
i








 Buyer’s  FOC  (Pi) (13) 
Equation (13) becomes the same regardless of whether one derivates with respect to P1 or P2, due to 
the symmetric presence of P1 and P2 in (11), and thus in (9). Equation (13) expresses that the buyer 
balances the marginal benefit against the marginal cost of consuming one additional unit xc of the 
production x that she has purchased. The LHS of (13) is the marginal benefit of consuming xc 
valued intrinsically at z, and it equals the RHS which is the marginal cost of y, multiplied with β 
which expresses how valuable is good x.
7 Solving (12) and (13) with respect to P1 and P2 gives 
12
12
111 222 111 222
,
() ( 1 ) () ( 1 )
zn y zn y
PP






Four points are worth noting about (14). First, the presence of β in the numerator and 1-β in the 
denominator means that both prices increase as good x become more desirable relative to money y 
as expressed in the Cobb-Douglas utilities. Second, the presence of both z1 and z2 in the 
denominator, and z1 and z2 respectively in the numerator, means that the intrinsic qualities have a 
direct impact on the prices. Third, the presence of ny in the numerator means that higher total 
production by all buyers increases prices. This can also be interpreted as inflation if ny gets adjusted 
                                                 
7 The equation system has 15 variables: x1,x2,y,x1c,x2c,xc,y1c,y2c,yc,z,P1,P2,U1,U2,U. Equations (1) and (9) provide three 
equations each, (2) and (10) provide two equations each, (3),(4),(5),(12),(13) provide one equation each, and 
(6),(7),(8),(11) are redundant. Equations (1),(3),(15),(16),(17) provide the 15 solutions.   11
to successively higher values without backing in actual possession of money y. Fourth, the 
presence of  11 nx and  22 nx in the denominator means that higher total production by all sellers 
decreases prices. If the sellers flood the market with good x, prices plummet. Inserting (14) into (10) 
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Inserting (15) and (16) into (9) gives 
1 1
11
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 (17) 
I am not aware of anyone having made a development such as in this section, but believe that the 
phenomenon of exchange is well understood without the need for further interpretation. The results 
in this section without signaling constitute a benchmark with which we compare the signaling 
results over the next sections. 
 
3 A model with signaling 
To introduce signaling we replace the production constraint in (1) with 
, ii i i i R ax bs R a y =+ =   Production constraint deducting signaling cost (18) 
where si is the signal by a representative seller of type i,  12 ss ≥ , and bi is the unit cost of signaling, 
i.e. the conversion coefficient (assumed constant) between seller i’s resource and level of signaling.
9 
To illustrate (18) consider an example with a car manufacturer which is divided into a production 
department and a sales/marketing/advertizing/consumer-help department (sales/marketing 
                                                 
8 Applying (1),(3),(16) gives  c x = 1 11 2 22 1 1 11 2 2 22 [( / / ) / ]/[ / / ] n Ra n Ra R az n Ra z n Ra β + + . 
9 Fremling and Posner (1999) analyze market signaling of personal characteristics. They consider an individual with an 
income I which is divided between nonconspicuous spending C versus enhancing status E, to illustrate individual 
behavior. Their objective is not to determine whether signaling is desirable or not from a societal point of view. They 
reinterpret many earlier experiments in terms of signaling.   12
department, for short). The example is similar to some internet shopping today. Everything done 
by the production department is production xi, while everything done by the sales/marketing 
department is signaling si, as in (18). Section 2 considered the benchmark that the car manufacturer 
focuses 100% on production and 0% on sales/marketing. This means that si=0 which causes 
maximum production xi=Ri/ai. Let us consider the characteristics of that benchmark more 
thoroughly. The car manufacturer has no sales/marketing department, but a huge production 
department. We define production broadly to include normal service such as trucking, inventories, 
floor space, shelving, cashiers, baggers, parking lots, etc. As part of the production process the cars 
are lined up in a huge hall. The location and condition of the hall are determined to shelter the cars 
against weather, theft, and other hazards, as part of safe production, with no signaling purpose. Each 
car gets a huge technical specification card which is placed on the front window, generated as part 
of the production process to distinguish the cars from each other, and prevent that the production 
process gets messy. Imagine that no one initially knows that the huge hall of cars exist, since there is 
no advertisement for it. People may get to know that the hall of cars exist if they observe it in their 
neighborhood, or hear from others through word-of-mouth that such a hall exists. People in the 
neighborhood start showing up in the hall to look at the cars. There are no sales people inside the 
hall since the car manufacturer does not invest in sales, since si=0. People cannot steal the cars since 
the car manufacturer has installed alarms, as part of the production process to ensure safe production 
where nothing is stolen. Purchasing a car means inserting a credit card into a slot. After the payment 
has been registered, the alarm on the car is turned off, the car becomes drivable, and the buyer is 
provided with a card that allows opening a door through which the car can be driven out of the hall. 
Removing an unpaid car from the hall in some unorthodox manner activates an alarm at the police 
station which arrests the perpetrator and places the car back into the hall upon which the insurance 
company repairs any damage caused. The insurance premium is part of safe production. 
Against this benchmark the car manufacturer contemplates boosting its sales/marketing 
department which we define as signaling. Whether signaling is good or bad depends to some extent 
on whether the signaling can contain useful information about various types of differences between 
the cars. General signals such as “these cars are high quality”, glitzy pictures of cars, or balloons at 
the car sales dealership, contain little useful information. The impact of such signals depends on the 
makeup of the consumers. They may have value for some and no value for others. At the other   13
extreme, car engineers may develop highly informative technical specifications which as signals 
may be incomprehensible for a lay audience. As a compromise, a possible signal is to claim that my 
product is excellent because of x,y, and z with a backup for the claims of x,y, and z. Signalers 
usually design a correlation between the cost of the signal and the impact they expect it to have, 
both when designing the content of the signal and the medium through which it is transmitted.
10 The 
cost of the signal is adjusted to be maximally productive with respect to the target audience. 
Since we have defined the production department so broadly, it is possible for our purpose 
to define everything that occurs in the sales/marketing department as signaling si. The 
sales/marketing department does nothing to boost the production xi or improve the quality of cars, 
but quite the contrary reduces production since resources get diverted away from production. 
Signaling in this model is detrimental in that it takes away resources from production. The utility 
from consuming a good arises only from the intrinsic quality of the good and the amount consumed. 
However, the prices depend on perceptions generated by signaling. Hence how much each player 
gets of each good determines the Cobb-Douglas utility. What the sales/marketing department does 
is to make the consumers aware of the cars, and convince more consumers to buy cars. If car 
purchases increase sufficiently due to signaling, despite producing fewer cars in the production 
department, diverting resources away from production and into signaling is worth wile. Signaling is 
always costly, but may generate higher utility if a higher price for one’s production is thereby 
obtained. Assuming zero signaling as a starting point, allowing consumers to better maximize utility 
subject to their income constraint, resources spent on signaling e.g. to provide consumer 
information, is more valuable than regular production, up to a point. The optimal balance between 
production and signaling occurs when the marginal benefits of production versus signaling are 
equal. That balance also depends on the unit costs ai and bi of production and signaling. Boosting 
the sales/marketing department means that the location and condition of the hall of cars are 
determined for optimal signaling effect. The hall’s existence and the characteristics of the cars are 
marketed broadly and professionally in all media. In addition to a technical specification card on 
each car, the hall is full of competent sales and marketing people discussing cars with potential 
                                                 
10 The internet becomes an increasingly important medium. Car manufacturers signal by allocating costs to develop the 
best internet presentations. Websites compare various aspects between cars, offer side-to-side comparisons of specific 
cars, price competition, recommend which cars go with differently sized drivers and passengers (tall, short, obese), and 
include articles on how well different cars do on speed, safety, reliability, etc..   14
consumers with the objective of boosting sales. The sales people add a personal touch to the sales 
process and provide information tailored to each consumer’s needs. 
Assume that the car manufacturer allocates 60% of its resource to the production department 
and 40% as signaling to the sales/marketing department. Each department makes further allocation 
into labor costs and other costs. For a firm with only one department, a 60%/40% split may be done 
by 60% of the work force in production and 40% in signaling, or that each employee spends 60% of 
his time on production and 40% of his time on signaling, or that each employee j is employed pj% in 
production and qj% in signaling, where the average pj over all employees is 60% and the average qj 
over all employees is 40%. 
The example above suggests a method to measure the total size and cost of signaling, for 
individual sellers, firms, within various industries, and in society at large at the local or global level. 
Compiling empirics for how resources are divided between production and non-production provides 
such a measure. The measure becomes explicit if signaling is defined in a clear-cut manner such as 
everything allocated to a sales/marketing department. For more narrow definitions of signaling, a 
more careful analysis of the budget within, say, the sales/marketing department, is needed to 
determine the total cost of signaling. 
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  Signaling Attention Function (19) 
where k is the power of truth parameter and r is the signaling decisiveness parameter. When k=r=0, 
the buyer has no information to distinguish the high quality good from the low quality good, and she 
sets equal price P1=P2. As r increases above one when k=0, signaling gains importance and the 
intrinsic qualities have no impact on the price ratio, and also no impact on the prices. When 0<r<1, 
the low quality producer gains disproportionally by enjoying a more favorable price ratio than that 
specified by the signaling ratio. When r=1, the price ratio equals the signaling ratio. When r>1, the 
high quality producer gains disproportionally. When r=∞, the high quality producer enjoys an 
infinite price ratio by signaling marginally more than the low quality producer. The signaling 
decisiveness r is a characteristic of the market or industry where the sellers and buyers operate. 
Some markets are extremely fierce and competitive, with a large r. Other markets are more relaxed,   15
with a small r. The competitiveness of a market may also change over time, causing r to fluctuate. 
This article considers a market at a given point in time when r has a fixed value. 
Signaling influences prices when the buyer lacks the opportunity, ability, experience, 
competence, time, or capacity to detect the true intrinsic qualities. Detecting intrinsic quality 
differentials is difficult for almost all goods. Holding two different sophisticated material products 
in one’s hand in a store may not be sufficient to detect quality differentials. The same holds for 
sophisticated immaterial products such as long distance traveling. For unsophisticated products, 
such as tomatoes, apples, grapes, inspecting the outside e.g. for degree of redness or shininess may 
not be sufficient to detect that the inside may be rotten or full of undesirable chemicals. Some 
differences may not become evident before the products reach old age. Goods can also be services. 
Examples are lawyers, real-estate agents, economic advisors, nannies, cleaners, doctors, hospitals, 
universities, schools, pre-schools. The buyers and consumers of goods and services are well advised 
to rely on signaling, to a small or large extent, as the circumstances suggest. This also suggests that 
the sellers are advised to signal optimally to maximize their utilities. 
As k increases from zero to one, the power of truth
11 becomes gradually more prominent as 
the buyer improves her ability to distinguish the two products. Equation (19) reduces to (12) when 
k=1 and r=0, in which case signaling does not matter and the price ratio equals the ratio of the 
intrinsic qualities. This case applies for some very unsophisticated products such as nails which one 
gets the opportunity to test with a hammer. Increasing k above one is also possible and means that 
the high quality good gets a larger price than what its intrinsic quality justifies. 
The four way diagram in Fig. 1 illustrates (18) and (19). The upper-right quadrant shows the 
range of seller 1’s choices between production x1 and signaling s1 within his budget constraint given 
by his resource R1=2. With a1=2/3 and b1=1, seller 1 can maximally produce x1=3 when s1=0, and 
can maximally (and hypothetically) signal s1=2 when x1=0. The diagonally opposite quadrant shows 
the corresponding choices for seller 2, ranging from x2=1 when s2=0 to s2=1 when x2=0, where 
R2=a2=b2=1. The lower-right quadrant shows how the production of the two types of sellers 
combines to generate production x1 and x2. Multiplying with the total numbers of high quality and 
                                                 
11 The power of truth ratio was first introduced by Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) in a Litigation Success Function. The 
idea is that the outcome of a legal battle depends on the true degree of fault by the Defendant multiplied by the ratio of 
litigation efforts by the two sides raised to a parameter. When the parameter is zero or the two sides invest equal efforts, 
then legal efforts are totally ineffective as compared with the power of truth, i.e. the underlying merits of the case.   16
low quality sellers gives the total production  11 nx+ 22 nx. The upper-left quadrant shows how the 
signaling s1 and s2 of the two types of sellers combine to generate the signaling ratio s1/s2 
exemplified with two straight lines (dotted and dashed) emerging from the origin. The signaling 
ratio is raised to the signaling decisiveness parameter r, and multiplied with the power of truth ratio 
raised to k, to yield the price ratio P1/P2. 
 
Fig. 1. Production quantity determination, and signaling ratio and price ratio determination. 
 
The dotted rectangle in Fig. 1 shows one possible outcome of the postulated interaction. The sellers 
produce modestly 
11
12 (,) x x =(1,1/4), and signal strongly 
11
12 (,) ss =(4/3,3/4). The straight dotted line 
from the origin in the upper-left quadrant goes through this latter point which determines the 
signaling ratio 
11
12 / ss =16/9. The dashed rectangle shows an alternative outcome where the sellers 
produce more heavily 
22
12 (,) x x =(2,3/4), and signal modestly 
22
12 (,) ss=(2/3,1/4). The straight dashed 
line determines the signaling ratio 
22
12 / ss =8/3 which is larger than 16/9. It is quite possible for 
different rectangles to cause equal signaling ratios, and thus also equal price ratios, but the total 
production and total signaling are different for different rectangles. 
The two additional free choice variables s1 and s2 for the two types of sellers are determined 















  Seller i’s FOC (si) (20)   17
There is no point in signaling if your own good is all that matters to you. In that extreme case the 
sellers keep all their production for themselves. Hence sellers are self-sufficient, which means that 
they are not sellers when β=1, and they also do not receive anything from buyers. Consequently, 
si=0 when β=1. At the other extreme, if the sellers find no interest in consuming their own 
production, but merely produce in order to sell, then signaling becomes maximally important. 
Inserting β=0 into (20) gives i s =/ [ ( 1 ) ] ii rR b r +  
The rightmost equation in (20) shows how seller i equates the total signaling cost  ii bs, 
measured with the same denomination as his resources, divided by the signaling decisiveness r 
(dimensionless) with that part of his production,  ( ) ii i c ax x − , also measured with the same 
denomination as his resources, which is delivered to the buyer. As the decisiveness increases, seller 
i signals more, and conversely if the decisiveness decreases. Equation (20) expresses how seller i 
strikes an optimal balance between signaling and production for delivery. Seller i’s signal depends 
on the decisiveness, which affects all agents, on his resources and unit signaling cost, the relative 
preference β for good x, and nothing else. That is, seller i’s signal depends neither on the intrinsic 
qualities nor on the unit production cost. 
Inserting i=1 and i=2 into (20), and inserting into (19) gives 
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 (21) 
The signaling ratio  12 / ss  increases if the high quality producer’s resource increases or his unit 
signaling cost decreases, relative to that of the low quality producer. Raising the signaling ratio to 
the power r, and multiplying with the power of truth ratio gives the price ratio  12 / PP , which may 
thus differ significantly from the ratio  12 / zz  of the intrinsic qualities. Neither the signaling ratio nor 
the price ratio depends on the relative preference β for good x since both sellers have the same 
relative preference for good x versus money y. 
Inserting (20) into  12 ss ≥  and rearranging gives 
12 1 2 1 2 // ss b bR R ≥⇔ ≤   Truthful Signaling Condition (22) 
which is a requirement for truthful signaling. It can be interpreted as a “decreasing-proportional-
marginal-cost” criterion for truthful signaling. It has commonly been believed that for a truthful   18
signaling equilibrium the unit cost of signaling must be lower for the high quality producer than 
for the low quality producer, that is  12 / bb <1. However, (22) shows that it is quite acceptable that 
12 / bb >1 provided that this disadvantage in higher unit signaling cost is sufficiently counterbalanced 
by the high quality producer’s resource superiority in endowed quality, such that  12 / R R  is 
sufficiently large. Interpreted in economic terms, both an income effect and a substitution effect are 
involved. Even if charged a higher price, an opulent consumer might purchase more than a poor 
person would – simply because he or she can afford to do so. Similarly here, a high quality producer 
may afford and find it optimal to signal more heavily than a low quality producer, despite higher 
unit cost of signaling.
12 











which reduces to (1) expressed as  i x =/ ii R a  when r=0. This means that signaling has a very 
straightforward impact on production, simply reducing it with the factor (1 (1 )) r β +− in the 
denominator. When β is large so that sellers prefer their own production, the signaling decisiveness 
does not matter much for production, and sellers produce close to their maximum  / ii R a . 
Conversely, when β is small so that sales are essential, the decisiveness matters more. As an 
example, with signaling decisiveness r=2 and β=1/2, the production is cut in half. As the signaling 
decisiveness approaches infinity, and β<1, the production approaches zero asymptotically. 
Endogenizing both production and signaling implies that “over-dissipation” always occurs. That is, 
since signaling is Pareto-inefficient, the sellers would always do better in aggregate never engaging 
in it. However, signaling can never outstrip the available resources in this model, in contrast to rent 
seeking models where the production is a fixed exogenously given constant. A rent seeking model 
allowing for signaling may thus allow both rent seeking and signaling to exceed available resources, 
which causes negative utilities. This is referred to as rent dissipation in the rent seeking literature. 
Simply replacing (1) with (23), that is inserting  i x =/ [ ( 1( 1 ) ) ] ii Ra r β + −  instead of  i x =/ ii R a , 
directly translates the solution without signaling into the solution with signaling. This makes 
                                                 
12 Within the biology literature a similar result has been independently discovered by Eshel et al. (2002), Hausken 
and Hirshleifer (2004), Houston (2003), Proulx et al. (2002). See Getty (2005) for a recent interpretation.   19
equations (2)-(11) and (13) in section 2 directly applicable for this section with signaling. 
However, equation (12) has been replaced with the more general Signaling Attention Function in 
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 (24) 
which of course reduces to (14) when k=1 and r=0. Four points can be made about (24) in addition 
to the four points after (14). First, k<1 gives lower power of truth than in (14), causing the high 
quality producer to suffer from a lower price than in (14). Second, k>1 causes a power of truth 
which exaggerates the intrinsic quality of the high quality product, causing the high quality producer 
to enjoy a higher price than in (14). Third, r<1 gives a disproportional advantage to the low quality 
producer despite his lower signal. Fourth, r>1 gives a disproportional advantage to the high quality 
producer, boosting the impact of his higher signal.  
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 (25) 
Both prices increase in the signaling decisiveness when β<1. As the decisiveness approaches 
infinity, both prices also approach infinity. The reason is that the production of good x approaches 
zero, since the sellers waste all their resources on signaling. With good x becoming extremely 
scarce, buyers become willing to pay extremely much for good x since they value it with the 
parameter β. For a given r and β, to the extent the high quality producer has a larger resource R1 and 
a lower unit cost b1 of signaling than the low quality producer, he enjoys a higher price P1 beyond 
that justified by the intrinsic quality z1 being larger than z2. For the special and uncommon case that 
12 Rb = 21 R b  and k=1, equation (25) is equivalent to (15) except that both prices in (25) are multiplied 
with (1 (1 )) r β +−. 
The analog of (16) for signaling is   20
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Note the equivalence with non signaling in (16) for the buyers’ consumption  c zx  and  c y . For the 
sellers’ consumption, there is division with (1 (1 )) r β + −  for good x, but no such division for 
money y due to the insertion of  i P  from (25). Signaling takes no toll on neither the sellers’ nor the 
buyers’ consumption of money y, but impacts the relative consumption of money y by the high 
quality versus low quality sellers. The high quality seller enjoys the ratio  12 21 [/ () ]
r RbR b in  1c y  in 
(26) which is larger than one if he enjoys a larger resource and a lower unit cost of signaling than 
the low quality producer, and much larger than one if also r is large. In this case he enjoys a higher 
consumption y1c of money y beyond that justified by the intrinsic quality z1 being larger than z2. 
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 (27) 
The first line in (27) is equivalent to (17) which shows that the basic structure of the Cobb-Douglas 
utilities is the same with and without signaling. Inserting the different price  i P  and different 
production  i x  with signaling gives the second and third lines for the seller utilities, which are lower   21
than that of (17). Equation (23) shows that a large β does not reduce production much compared 
with the non signaling case. Similarly in (27), a large β is beneficial for the seller utilities. However, 
a large decisiveness reduces the utilities to sellers due to the presence of (1 (1 )) r β +− in the 
denominator. Inserting k=1 and r=0 into (27) causes reduction of (27) to (17). 
When xi has been determined by (23) and as illustrated in Fig. 1, and Pi has been determined 
by (25), seller i determines  ic x = i x β   from (10) or (26) and  ic y = [(1 )/ ] ii c Px β β −  from (11) or (26). 
This is illustrated in Fig. 2 where the dotted lines exemplify 
1
ic x  and 
1
ic y , where β=0.5 and Pi=zi=1. 
The utility isoquants for seller i are shown with dashed and dotted lines for five values of Ui given 
by (9). If seller i signals strongly, the price Pi increases, and the angle of the dashed line giving  ic y  
increases, while  ic x  decreases because of the resource constraint. The angle is 45 degrees in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Consumption  ic x   and  ic y , and utility isoquants Ui for seller i. 
 
For the buyer,  c zx  and  c y  are determined by (11) or (26), and z is determined by (3), which gives 
c x  and  c y = [(1 )/ ] c zx β β −  illustrated with the dashed line in Fig. 3. The dashed line crosses the 
buyer’s resource constraint y=R/a= c zx + c y  given by (4) and shown with a solid line. The crossing   22
point gives the buyer’s consumption exemplified with 
1
c x  and 
1
c y  shown with dotted lines, where 
β=0.5 and R=a=z=1. The utility isoquants for the buyer are shown with dashed and dotted lines for 
five values of U given by (9). If the weighted intrinsic quality z of good x increases, or β decreases, 
then the angle of the dashed line giving  c y  increases, while  c x  decreases because of the resource 
constraint. The angle is 45 degrees in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Consumption  c x   and  c y , resource constraint, and utility isoquants U for the buyer. 
 
This section shows that with signaling, the sellers suffer lower production, lower consumption of 
good x, and lower utilities, while the buyers enjoy the same production, the same consumption of 
both goods, and the same utilities. In the next section we remove this asymmetry between sellers 
and buyers. 
 
4 Adjusting the signaling model to account for price inflation 
One characteristic of the model in section 3 is that the buyer consumes the same portion (1 ) y β −  of 
her possession of money, pays the same portion  y β  of her amount of money to the seller, and 
receives the same utility regardless of the amount of signaling by the sellers. That is, even when she 
receives almost nothing of good x from the seller in exchange for her fixed delivery of  y β , she   23
receives the same utility. The reason for this is that there is no fixed reference point to assess the 
value of that part of good x that she receives. When the supply of x goes down, the scarcity of good 
x causes the price to go up according to the price definition in (11),  /[ (1 )] ii c i Pyx β = − , which 
applies for both signaling and non signaling, though  i x  is lower with signaling. We refer to the 
factor (1 (1 )) r β +− in the prices as the inflation factor. It approaches infinity when the decisiveness 
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 (28) 
The two types of sellers still affect prices through the factor  12 21 [/ () ]
r RbR b which depends on their 
resources and unit signaling costs, and on the signaling decisiveness. Removing (1 (1 )) r β +− on 
the one hand removes inflation, and on the other hand removes the differential impact that (1 ) β − , 
multiplied by r, has on inflation. That is, a high preference for money y, which means a high 
(1 ) β − , means more inflation when the signaling decisiveness is high. To understand (28), consider 
/ ii i i PnR a  which expresses the total value of all the type i sellers’ production in the benchmark case 
of no signaling. That is, it multiplies the unit price  i P  with the production  / ii R a  assuming no waste 
on signaling, which is multiplied with the number  i n  of sellers of type i. 
 
Inflation adjustment property 1. The total value  11 1 1 22 2 2 // PnR a Pn R a +  of the production of all 
sellers of the two types in the benchmark case of no signaling equals  /[ (1 )] nR a β β −  for both the 
non signaling prices in (15) and for the inflation adjusted signaling prices in (28), but equals the 
larger expression   (1 (1 )) /[ (1 )] nR r a β ββ +− − for the regular inflated signaling prices in (25). 
 
The proof follows from insertion into the specified equations. This property provides a common 
benchmark for non signaling and signaling in the sense that the total value of the production of all 
sellers, measured by the benchmark case of no waste on signaling, is the same without and with   24
signaling when adjusting for inflation. The prices may still differ for non signaling and signaling, 
since (15) and (28) are different, but a common benchmark  /[ (1 )] nR a β β −  has been determined. 
Signaling causes the sellers to deliver less of good x to the buyers. With the regular 
signaling prices in (25), the buyers in aggregate pay the same monetary amount ny β  to the sellers 
in exchange. Accordingly, there is no division with the inflation factor (1 (1 )) r β + −  in the sellers’ 
monetary consumption  1c y  and  2c y  in (26). With inflation adjusted signaling prices,  1c y  and  2c y  
are indeed divided by (1 (1 )) r β +−. Using market clearance of money y in (5) to determine  c y , 
and (4) or (11) to determine  c zx , gives 
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 (29) 
Comparing (29) with the first line in (26) shows, first, that each seller consumes the same amount of 
good x with signaling prices and inflation adjusted signaling prices. Second, each seller consumes 
less of money y in (29) since the prices are divided by (1 (1 )) r β + − . Third, each buyer consumes 
less of good x in (29) since signaling causes less of good x to be produced, exchanged, and 
consumed, and with inflation adjustment this causes division with (1 (1 )) r β + − . Fourth, each buyer 
consumes more of money y in (29) since paying less to the seller allows her to keep more money for 
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 (30) 
The presence of 
1
i P
β −  in the seller utilities in (17), (27), (30) causes inflation adjustment, which 
entails division with the inflation factor (1 (1 )) r β + − , to imply division with the inflation factor   25
raised to (1 ) β − . Dividing the inflation adjusted signaling utilities in (30) with the regular 
signaling utilities in (27) gives 
1
1
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which show lower utilities for both sellers and buyers. Equations (27) and (30) have in common that 
sellers suffer lower utilities because signaling diverts attention from production causing less 
consumption of good x. However, with inflation adjustment, the sellers suffer even lower utilities 
because their reduced delivery of good x earns them a lower price and thus less of money y in 
exchange. Equations (17) and (27) give the same utility for the buyers, even though they get less of 
good x with signaling. The reason is the inflated prices which camouflage what the buyers actually 
consume of good x. With infinite prices they get nothing of good x, but pay the same amount of 
money y to the sellers. With inflation adjustment, the buyers keep more money y for their own 
consumption, and accordingly get less of good x than they would optimally prefer without 
signaling. Consequently, with signaling and inflation adjustment the buyers earn lower utility than 
without signaling. 
As an alternative to dividing the prices with the inflation factor (1 (1 )) r β + − , referred to as 
inflation adjustment, this section can equally well be written with a focus on what buyers and sellers 
actually exchange with each other in terms of goods. Without signaling the buyer delivers 
c zx = c yy − =/ R a β  to the seller, as shown in (4) and (11) inserting (1). With signaling, assume that 
each buyer instead decides to deliver the smaller amount  c zx = c yy − =/ [ ( 1 ( 1) ) ] Rar β β +− , 
determined by dividing the non signaling payment (delivery) of money y with the factor 
(1 (1 )) r β +−. As can be seen from (29), this is exactly the value of  c zx  determined by inflation 
adjustment of prices. For (13) to be valid, this implies that the prices are divided by (1 (1 )) r β +−. 
Hence adjusting the prices with the inflation factor, or dividing the buyer’s payment of money y 
with the same factor, is equivalent. 
 
5 Buyer screening search costs for choosiness 
The previous sections have assumed that the buyer reads the signals s1 and s2, is affected by the 
power of truth ratio  12 (/)
k zz , but otherwise converts her entire resource R into generating money y   26
at unit production cost a, where y=R/a is defined in (1). In praxis the buyer invests time and 
effort, and thus resources R, into screening and distinguishing the high quality good x1 with intrinsic 
quality z1 from the low quality good x2 with intrinsic quality z2. She travels back and forth between 
producers, she discusses with producers, other buyers, experts and others, she compares the goods 
with each other, and she gradually learns more about the goods. We refer to the cost of this 
investment as search costs for choosiness.
13 The buyer is choosy regarding her choice of good x1 
versus good x2, which is costly. To account for the buyer’s two kinds of investment, we replace the 
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  New production constraint (32) 
which deducts both signaling cost for the sellers and search costs for choosiness for the buyer. The 
larger is the buyer’s search costs for choosiness, the less she invests into generating money y. That 
is, here monetary possession y becomes lower due to subtraction of search costs. The buyer’s search 
costs for choosiness satisfies two assumptions. 
 
A1. The larger is the difference between the intrinsic qualities z1 and z2, expressed with a large ratio 
z1/z2, the smaller is the search costs for choosiness, since it is easier to detect a large difference than 
a small difference in intrinsic quality. 
 
A2. The larger is the difference between the prices P1 and P2 chosen by the buyer, expressed with 
P1-P2, the larger is the search costs for choosiness, since the buyer can be expected to invest more 
effort to justify a basis for such a price difference. 
 
Applying assumptions 1 and 2 multiplicatively gives  12 2 1 () / PP zz − , which we multiply with a 
parameter h adjusted to ensure that  12 2 1 () / hP P z z − <1. This ensures that the buyer divides her 
resource into production and search costs for choosiness, and that none of the costs alone or in sum 
exceed her available resource R which would yield a negative monetary possession. 
                                                 
13 Hausken and Hirshleifer (2004) introduce a “congestion function” to avoid that females mate exclusively with 
high quality males. Females may have to wait in line for preferred males, or spend time and effort searching for 
them. For economic signaling congestion does not operate in this manner. Hence we refer to search costs for 
choosiness.   27
Also in this section equations (2)-(11) and (13) in section 2 are applicable, and 
additionally (19) which implies (20)-(23). However, the buyer’s FOC in (13) does not apply since 
the buyer’s new production constraint in (32) depends on the prices P1 and P2. The symmetric 
presence of P1 and P2 in zxc, yc, and y in (11) and (9) made it irrelevant in (13) whether derivation 
was made with respect to P1 and P2. Although P1 and P2 are still symmetrically present in zxc, they 
are not symmetrically present in y in (32), and thus also not in  cc yy z x = − , nor in the utility in (9). 
The nature of screening search costs for choosiness, regardless of how (32) is designed, amounts to 
introducing an asymmetry between the high quality producer and the low quality producer, and thus 
between P1 and P2. Consequently, in this section we let the buyer choose P1 optimally, where P2 
follows from the signaling attention function in (19). Calculating the new buyer’s FOC gives 
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  New buyer’s FOC (P1) (33) 
which reduces to (13) when h=0. Solving (19) and (33) with respect to P1 and P2, and inserting  i x  
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which reduces to (25) when h=0. The additional term multiplied with h in the denominator causes 
the prices P1 and P2 to be lower than the signaling prices in (25). Inserting (34) into (32) gives 
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which reduces to (1) and (18), that is y=R/a, when h=0. The buyer’s monetary possession y is of 
course lower in (35) due to search costs for choosiness. The first line in (26) is replaced with 
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Compared with (26), the seller’s consumption of good x remains the same. The seller’s 
consumption of money y is lower due to lower prices P1 and P2. The buyer’s consumption of good x 
is lower since she delivers less of money y to the seller. Finally, the buyer’s consumption of money 
is lower since her monetary possession y is lower due to search costs for choosiness. Inserting (36) 
into the (9) gives 
11 1 (1 ) , (1 ) iii i UP x z Uy
ββ β β β β ββ ββ
−− − =− = −  (37) 
where Pi and y are given by (34) and (35). Compared with (27), seller i’s utility is lower due to 
lower price Pi, and the buyer’s utility is lower due to lower monetary possession due to search costs 
for choosiness. Hence whereas signaling in (27) in section 3, where inflation also plays a role, 
causes lower utility to the sellers, and the same utility to the buyers as for non signaling, the solution 
in (37) gives lower utility to sellers, since prices decrease, and lower utility to buyers, since search 
costs for choosiness cause buyers to possess less money, compared with section 3. 
 
6 Screening search costs for choosiness and inflation adjusted signaling 
The additive presence of a term multiplied with h in the denominator in (34) implies that dividing 
the prices with (1 (1 )) r β +− does not satisfy the inflation adjustment property 1 in section 4. This 
section adjusts for inflation in two alternative manners.  
 
Inflation adjustment property 2. The prices are divided by (1 (1 )) r β + − , which is equivalent to 
dividing the buyer’s payment (delivery) of money y with (1 (1 )) r β + − . 
 
Since the inflation factor (1 (1 )) r β +− is present in both the numerator and denominator in the 
inflated prices in (34), merely dividing with this factor as in inflation adjustment property 2 may not 
be fully satisfactory. Let us therefore motivate a more sophisticated property. The agents’ 
consumption and utilities are   29
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The utilities are lower with than without inflation adjustment for both sellers and buyers for the 
same reasons as in section 4. Compared with the case without inflation adjusted signaling in section 
5, the sellers suffer lower utility due to the lower prices due to receiving less money, and the buyers 
suffer lower utility since they pay less money in exchange for less of good x than what would be 
optimal without signaling. 
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The total value of the production of all sellers of the two types is 
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determined by removing the inflation factor (1 (1 )) r β + −  from both the numerator, and the term 
multiplied with h in the denominator, in the prices in (34). The total value of the production of all 
sellers of the two types is 
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, which is possible without 
removing signaling. Hence we consider (42) as an alternative benchmark for inflation adjustment. 
In accordance with this motivation, we propose the following inflation adjustment property. 
 
Inflation adjustment property 3. The total value  11 1 1 22 2 2 // PnR a Pn R a +  of the production of all 
sellers of the two types in the benchmark case of search costs for choosiness and no signaling 
equals the expression in (42) for both the non signaling prices in (40) and for the inflation adjusted 













, but equals a larger expression for the inflated 
signaling prices in (34). 
 
Inserting the inflation adjusted prices in (43) into (32) gives the production   31
11 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
22 1 1 2 1 1 1
11 2 1 1 2 2 2 11 2 2 2 1
22 1 1 2 1 22 11 1 2
(1 ) 1
(1 ) (1 )
kr
kr kr
zR b n R n R n R a z R
h
az R b a a n R a z
y
zR b n R n R n R z zR b n R a
h
zR b aa a z zR bn R a
β
β ββ
     
 +− +    
       =
        
   +− + + − −      
           
 (45) 
The agents’ consumption and utilities are as in (38) and (39). The inflation adjustment property 3 
gives larger prices than the inflation adjustment property 2 due to removal of the inflation factor 
(1 (1 )) r β +− in both the numerator and denominator of the prices. This gives higher utility to the 
sellers who get paid more in terms of money y in exchange for their delivery of good x. 
Accordingly the utility to buyers is lower. Table 1 briefly categorizes some characteristics of 
sections 2,3,4,5,6. 
 
Section  Seller i’s  ic x  Seller  i’s  ic y  Buyer’s  c zx  Buyer’s  c y  
2 No signaling  i x β  (1 ) ii Px β −   y β  (1 ) y β −  
3 Signaling  Lower  Similar  The same  The same 
4 Inflation adjustment  The same as 
with 
signaling 
Lower Lower Higher 
5 Search costs for 
choosiness 
The same as 
with 
signaling 
Lower than with 
signaling 
Lower than with 
signaling 
Lower than with 
signaling 

















Section Prices  Seller  i’s  utility Buyer’s  utility 
2 No signaling 
11 1 1 22 2 2
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11 (1 ) ii i Px z
β ββ β ββ
− − −  
1 (1 ) y
β β ββ
− −  
3 Signaling  Higher  Lower  The same 
4 Inflation 
adjustment 
Similar to no signaling  Lower than with 
signaling 
Lower 
5 Search costs 
for choosiness 
Lower than with signaling  Lower than with 
signaling 
Lower than with 
signaling 





Lower than without inflation 
adjustment 





Table 1. A categorization of characteristics for sections 2,3,4,5,6. 
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7 Conclusion 
An equilibrium model of signaling, production, and exchange is presented. It goes beyond previous 
models by examining signaling in a setting in which sellers allocate resources between signaling 
and producing a good with a high versus low intrinsic quality. In contrast to partial equilibrium 
models where one side is often kept to its reservation value, both sides of the exchange are made 
worse off due to the distortive signaling activities. Buyers read signals, screen for quality of each 
good, choose prices optimally, and pay money (or some numeraire good) in exchange. The article 
supplements partial equilibrium models common within economic theory since Spence’s (1973) 
contribution. The differences between partial equilibrium models and the general equilibrium 
approach in this article are outlined in the introduction.  
A basic model of exchange without signaling is developed as a reference standard. On the 
one side there are high quality and low quality producers (sellers) in given numbers producing good 
x with two unknown qualities. On the other side there are buyers in a given number producing the 
numeraire good y which is money with known quality and a price one per unit. The buyers can be 
thought of as possessing money which they generate in some manner. How much to consume of 
good x is each seller’s free choice variable, and what price to choose is each buyer’s free choice 
variable. The Cobb-Douglas utilities depend on the amount of money received or kept, the intrinsic 
quality of each good, and the quantity of each good consumed. 
Introducing signaling, each seller makes a tradeoff between how much of his resource to 
invest into production versus signaling. Signaling boosts sales but diverts resources away from 
production, causing less to be produced. The utility from consuming a good arises from the intrinsic 
quality, and how much is consumed Signaling is each seller’s second free choice variable. A 
signaling attention function adjusts how buyers pay attention to signals. It depends on the ratio of 
the signals by the high quality and low quality sellers, the competitiveness of the market expressed 
with a signaling decisiveness parameter, and the ratio of the intrinsic qualities of good x raised to a 
power of truth parameter. Signaling causes lower utility for sellers. The advantage of the model is to 
illustrate how sellers make tradeoffs between production and signaling, which can be verified 
empirically, and how buyers choose how much to purchase of high quality versus low quality 
goods. The total numbers of sellers of the two types determine the total production of goods in the 
market, and the total number of buyers determines the total presence of money in the market.   33
Signaling causes decreased availability (scarcity) of good x which causes the price of 
good x to increase. In the basic signaling model the buyer pays the seller the same amount in terms 
of money y as without signaling. However, since the price of good x is higher, she receives a lower 
amount of good x in return. In terms of what she actually gets to consume of goods she thus suffers 
a loss because of signaling. To account for such price inflation, each buyer’s payment of money y is 
divided with an inflation factor which satisfies a specified inflation adjustment property, which 
means that the prices are divided by the same inflation factor. This gives an even lower utility to 
sellers who get less of money y. The buyers get lower utility than without signaling since they keep 
a larger amount of money y, and get a smaller amount of good x, than they would optimally prefer. 
Screening product quality is no easy task for buyers. Introducing search costs for choosiness, 
each buyer makes a tradeoff between how much money y to pay for good x in the two qualities, 
given that she has a preference for both money and good x. Search costs are especially high if she 
seeks to establish a large price differential between the high quality and low quality product, and if 
the actual difference in intrinsic qualities is small. Compared with the signaling solution, both 
sellers and buyers get lower utilities since some of the buyers’ money is wasted on search costs, 
leaving buyers to hold less money, and to pay less money to sellers in exchange for good x. The 
article finally combines buyer search costs and inflation adjustment. Compared with the case 
without inflation adjusted signaling, sellers get lower utility due to lower prices, and buyers get 
lower utility since they do not get the optimal mixture of good x and money y. Future research may 
work to endogenize the signaling decisiveness parameter, which seems to be no easy task. 
 
Appendix 
Given the buyers’ choice of the price P1, on the seller side there will be in equilibrium a chosen pair 
of signaling levels s1 and s2 for the two seller types. Given that, within each type of sellers, all 
sellers are identical, each individual seller’s chosen signaling level is independent of the choices of 
the other sellers of his type. So for each seller type we can think of a typical or representative 
individual as optimizing by differentiating U1 or U2, as the case may be, with respect to the 
respective signaling levels s1 or s2. The result below has been confirmed by considering a fraction of 
deviants within each seller type signaling si’ rather than si. Derivating the utility of a deviating seller 
with respect to his deviant signal, taking the non-deviating signals si as given, and the signals by the   34
other seller type as given, gives the same result when subsequently assuming that in equilibrium 
there is no deviation: si’ = si. Solving (18) with respect to x1 for i=1 gives  1 x = 11 11 () / R bs a − . 
Inserting into (2) and applying (10) gives  1c y = 11 1 1 1 () ( 1 ) / PR b s a β − − . Solving (19) with respect to 
P1, inserting P1 into this equation, and inserting  1c y  into (9), and simplifying, gives 
1












−    −
 =−      
 (A1) 
Equation (A1) can also be obtained by inserting  1 x  and  1 P , determined by (18) and (19), into the 
leftmost equation in (17). Derivating U1 with respect to s1, and setting the derivative equal to zero, 
gives 
11 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 11 /0 ( ) ( 1 ) /( ) c U s bs r R bs bs r a x x β ∂∂ =⇒ = − − ⇔ = −  Seller 1’s FOC (s1) (A2) 
where the rightmost equation follows from using (10) and (18). Analogous reasoning for seller 2 
gives (20).   35
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